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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have frequently used sanctions to fight declining levels of democracy
and human rights violations abroad. However, some of the world’s most repressive autocracies have never been sub-
jected to sanctions, while other more competitive authoritarian regimes have been exposed to repeated sanction epi-
sodes. In this article, we concentrate on the cost–benefit analysis of Western senders that issue democratic sanctions,
those which aim to instigate democratization, against authoritarian states. We argue that Western leaders weight
domestic and international pressure to impose sanctions against the probability of sanction success and the sender’s
own political and economic costs. Their cost–benefit calculus is fundamentally influenced by the strength of trigger
events indicating infringements of democratic and human rights. Western sanction senders are most likely to respond
to coups d’e´tat, the most drastic trigger events, and tend to sanction vulnerable targets to a higher extent than stable
authoritarian regimes. Senders are also more likely to sanction poor targets less integrated in the global economy and
countries that do not align with the Western international political agenda, especially in responding to ‘weaker’ trig-
ger events such as controversial elections. The analysis is carried out using a new dataset of US and EU sanctions
against authoritarian states in the period 1990–2010.
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War initiated a rapid global
wave of democratization. With the new unipolar
world order dominated by the United States, democ-
racy and human rights rose on the global agenda and
Western states increased their pressure on authoritar-
ian regimes to democratize (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
As a consequence, the expectation has increased on
Western powers, such as the European Union and the
United States, to respond with sanctions against states
where elections have been rigged, opposition forces
have been repressed or elected leaders have been dis-
posed from power.
Although sanctions have become an important tool
to respond to authoritarianism globally, there is a gen-
eral suspicion – both in the public debate and the
academic literature – that Western leaders use them
selectively. Indeed, intuitively it seems puzzling that
some of the most autocratic regimes with the poorest
human rights records have escaped international sanc-
tions, whereas several more competitive and liberal
regimes have been subjected to repeated sanction
episodes.
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The academic literature has only partly dealt with
these issues, analyzing the ‘selection effects’ associated
with the imposition of sanctions more generally (and not
only in relation to sanctions specifically designed to pro-
mote democracy and human rights). Moreover, the dis-
cussion about ‘selection effects’ has often been associated
with the study of sanction effectiveness, arguing that
strategic target selection has skewed the empirical results
of studies focusing on the general effectiveness of these
coercive measures (e.g. Drezner, 1999; Lacy & Niou,
2004; Morgan, Bapat & Krustev, 2009; Nooruddin,
2002). Lack of systematic research on the selective use
of democratic sanctions is troubling, especially given new
contributions to comparative democratization research
suggesting that Western powers have had a tendency
to promote stability rather than democracy in strategi-
cally and economically important countries (Brownlee,
2012; Donno, 2013).
Responding to these studies, we concentrate on sanc-
tions that explicitly aim to improve the level of democ-
racy or human rights protection (hereafter ‘democratic
sanctions’), asking the question: What factors affect the
likelihood that the USA and the EU as the main global
sanction senders impose democratic sanctions on author-
itarian regimes?
We theorize that Western leaders use democratic
sanctions to promote foreign policy goals, strengthen
their international reputation and increase domestic sup-
port. We identify three factors which determine Western
leaders’ cost–benefit calculus to impose democratic sanc-
tions: (1) the domestic and global pressure to impose
sanctions on the target, (2) target vulnerability (likeli-
hood of success), and (3) the anticipated sender costs.
To support our theoretical argument, we utilize a
newly compiled dataset of post-Cold War sanctions
issued against authoritarian regimes in the period
1990–2010 and run a series of logistic regressions. The
analysis shows that coups d’e´tat are the strongest predic-
tor for the imposition of democratic sanctions, as they
are the most blatant signal of democratic and human
rights infringements, but also ‘weaker’ triggers such as
controversial elections significantly increase the pros-
pects for democratic sanctions. Target vulnerability is
another fundamental consideration, as sanction senders
are eager to show their ability to affect domestic policies
in target countries. Lastly, we show that sanctions are
more likely against countries where the Western senders
have the least to lose from regime destabilization. Sanc-
tions are more commonly imposed on economically
poor countries and on countries with low levels of for-
eign direct investments. The political orientation of the
prospective target is also important, as democratic sanc-
tions are more likely to be imposed against authoritarian
countries exhibiting an international agenda distinct
from that of the EU and the USA.
This article proceeds as follows. After discussing the
particularity of democratic sanctions and of coups, con-
troversial elections, and decreasing human rights as
potential triggers for their use, we examine how, in inter-
relation with these dynamic trigger events, three struc-
tural factors affect the probability of democratic
sanctions. We then present the data and the research
design, followed by the discussion of empirical results
on the selective targeting of democratic sanctions. We
conclude with a discussion on the implications of our
findings.
The logic of democratic sanctions
Democratic sanctions have become an important tool for
Western leaders to show domestic and international
audiences that they are serious about international norms
of democracy and human rights and do not tolerate dras-
tic departures from such principles. More than 50% of
all the sanctions directed toward autocratic regimes
recorded in the new global dataset on post-Cold War
sanctions explicitly aim to bring about democratization,
that is, improvements in civil liberties and political
rights. Political rights and civil liberties are conceptually
distinct in that the former focuses on participation in the
political process, most fundamentally electoral rights,
and the latter on freedom of expression and the physical
integrity of citizens, that is, human rights. However, they
are closely interlinked as the liberalization of the political
system is the prime means to strengthen non-repressive
governance, whereas improved human rights open up
the potential for increased political rights (Davenport &
Armstrong, 2004; Møller & Skaaning, 2013). We
therefore perceive sanctions that seek to strengthen
political or human rights as ‘democratic sanctions’.1
Although democracy has become increasingly
accepted as a global norm after the end of the Cold War
and Western states have pursued an ambitious agenda in
promoting democracy internationally, instigating demo-
cratization or even foreign regime change is arguably
less central to Western countries’ international political
1 Empirically, there is also a significant overlap between human rights
and democracy sanctions. In our sample, there are only two instances
where human rights sanctions were implemented against
authoritarian regimes without also demanding improvements in
political rights.
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agenda than the safeguarding of domestic security and
economic interests (McKoy & Miller, 2012). It has,
hence, been argued that democracy promotion ‘has
played at best a secondary role’ (Schraeder, 2003: 33)
in the foreign policy of Western democracies. When
regimes breach international democratic norms, Western
states are more likely to make a strategic decision involv-
ing the potential costs of issuing a sanction and the
expected chances of achieving concessions from the tar-
get than in security-related issues (Donno, 2013).
Summarizing the widespread consensus, Donno
(2013: 5) states that ‘[e]nforcement is less likely to be
found in geopolitically important countries or strategic
allies where the external actor’s interest in promoting
democracy is trumped by other foreign policy goals’.
Figure 1 indeed shows clear patterns in the imposition
of democratic sanctions. Most strikingly, the stable (at
least until the wake of the Arab Spring) and strategically
important authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region have been spared. Indeed,
Middle Eastern scholars have questioned whether espe-
cially the American reluctance to enforce democratic
norms in some Middle Eastern countries reflects the
existence of other more central goals in the US foreign
policy agenda (Brownlee, 2012).
Whereas democracy can be interpreted as a secondary
goal in the hierarchy of foreign policy objectives of
potential Western senders, the demands associated with
democratic sanctions constitutes a major threat to the
target (Escriba`-Folch & Wright, 2010; Marinov, 2005).
In accordance, the sanctions literature identified democ-
racy as a ‘major sanction goal’, where targets are unlikely
to respond to sanction threats by accommodating sender
demands (Drezner, 1999: 107–112; Drury & Li, 2006;
Hufbauer et al., 2007). Such theoretical expectations
are supported by data from Morgan, Bapat & Krustev
(2009), the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES)
dataset on sanction threats and imposed sanctions.2
Only 10% of sanction threats related to democracy or
human rights accomplished a complete or partial con-
cession by the target, whereas sanction threats linked
to other goals resulted in the complete or partial conces-
sion of targets in 22% of cases.
Strategic targeting of democratic sanctions
Democratic sanctions are important for Western leaders
to promote foreign policy goals of global democratiza-
tion, to show a decisive international stand and to garner
domestic public support. However, as argued in the
Figure 1. Map of authoritarian states and imposed democratic sanctions
White countries have been democracies for most of the period 1990–2010; black-colored countries were autocracies for most of the period but
have not been subjected to democratic sanctions; grey countries are autocracies that were subjected to democratic sanctions for at least one year
of the observed period. Classifications according to Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius (2013).
2 Data include threats of sanctions against all countries classified as
authoritarian by Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius (2013) issued by
the EU or the USA. Due to small-N for the post-Cold War period
(Morgan, Bapat & Krustev [2009] collect data from 1971–2000),
data for the Cold War period were also included for this test.
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section above, democracy has only been secondary in the
hierarchy of foreign policy goals. Senders can, hence, be
expected to issue sanctions in a strategic manner to max-
imize domestic political support, international reputa-
tion, and policy impact in the targeted state, while
minimizing their own expected economic and political
costs. In our analysis, we focus on three different dimen-
sions that are crucial for the cost–benefit analysis of
Western leaders and their decision to sanction an author-
itarian state. Below we hypothesize how these dimen-
sions independently and in combination affect the
willingness of Western senders to impose democratic
sanctions.
Pressure to impose sanctions
As Western nations have become increasingly vocal in
their advocacy for democracy, there has also been an
increased expectation to react to human rights violations
and autocratic tendencies globally (Jentleson, 2000:
127). Western leaders find it increasingly difficult to
ignore human rights abuses in authoritarian states; doing
so leaves them vulnerable to domestic criticism by their
political opponents, civil society, and the media (Risse,
Ropp & Sikkink, 2013). However, authoritarian back-
sliding can take many forms and different signs of demo-
cratic retreat are likely to cause varying levels of public
and political attention. Surprisingly, existing research ana-
lyzing the imposition of sanctions has almost exclusively
focused on structural variables – be they related to the sen-
der or to the target, or to the dyadic relationship between
the two3 – and has neglected the actual autocratic behavior
of the target (see for instance Cox & Drury, 2006; Drez-
ner, 1998; Hafner-Burton &Montgomery, 2008; Lekt-
zian& Souva, 2007;Nooruddin, 2002;Whang, 2010).4
In addition, there has been puzzlingly little discussion
on whether sanctions are mostly used as a reaction to
authoritarian stability or democratic decline (Escriba`-
Folch & Wright, 2010; Escriba`-Folch, 2012). Some
authors state that sanctions are usually used as a reaction
to drastic democratic deterioration (Laakso, Kivima¨ki &
Seppa¨nen, 2007), whereas others suggest that the most
severe repressors are selected in the first place (Peksen &
Drury, 2010; Peksen, 2009; Wood, 2008). Yet, there has
not been a systematic analysis on how ‘trigger variables’,
such as coups d’e´tat, flawed elections or swift deterioration
of human rights, in conjunction with structural variables,
influence the decision to impose sanctions.
We expect that pressure to sanction an authoritarian
regime is especially high when dramatic trigger events
not only create global attention but also justification for
foreign intervention. Coups d’e´tat, understood as suc-
cessful, ‘illegal and overt attempts by the military or
other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sit-
ting executive’ (Powell & Thyne, 2011: 252), are the
most blatant signal to the international arena of violating
democratic norms with no detailed fact-finding neces-
sary. In addition, coups not only constitute a deteriora-
tion of democracy but regularly have severe security
implications, domestically and regionally. Hence, we
expect coups d’e´tat to be the most powerful predictor
of the imposition of democratic sanctions.
Also, elections whose preparation, organization, and
outcome are contested by international observers (Hyde,
2011; Kelley, 2010) and the sheer deterioration of
human rights without drastic events can serve as a stron-
ger trigger than continuously low levels of democratic
rights. However, fraudulent elections and human rights
deteriorations often do not attract the same international
attention as coups d’e´tat. Moreover, the complicated
nature of these ‘weaker’ signals often provides a less clear
mandate for using coercive foreign policy measures. As
these ambiguities give Western leaders more leeway in
selecting targets strategically, we expect senders to be
especially reluctant to impose democratic sanctions in
relation to these weaker signals when the expected cost
to target is high.
H1: The probability of democratic sanctions
increases when dramatic trigger events, such as
coups d’e´tat, heighten the expectations on the
sender to impose sanctions.
Target vulnerability
Not only do senders have an incentive to appear firm in
their enforcement of democracy, they also have strong
reasons to appear successful when deciding to do so.
Governments that issue unsuccessful sanctions or back-
track in international conflicts more generally both
appear weak in front of domestic audiences and will lose
reputation on the international stage (Clare & Danilovic,
2010; Schelling, 1980). Moreover, repeated unsuccessful
sanctions will devalue the tool’s effectiveness as a mean to
instigate democratization in foreign states as regimes
threatened by the imposition of sanctions would have
3 This is obviously a simplified situation as more complex sanction
networks might be at play (Cranmer, Heinrich & Desmarais,
2014) and as the changing international system has also been
mentioned (Marinov & Goemans, forthcoming).
4 Drury (2000) also considered domestic US politics as potential
factors to influence the decision to impose sanctions but found that
they are of secondary importance compared to sender–target relations.
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few incentives to accommodate senders’ demands (Drez-
ner, 1998; Hovi, Huseby & Sprinz, 2005). In light of
this argument, senders should be more willing to impose
sanctions against weak targets – those with crumbling
economies, domestic protests, and fragmented ruling
coalitions – as such regimes are more likely to concede
or break down in the face of sanctions.
The most immediate signal to potential senders is pro-
vided by the occurrence of mass protests (Teorell, 2010).
In these cases, sanctioners can reasonably expect that
their measures will contribute to a further destabilization
of autocrats (Major, 2012). Target vulnerability can also
arise due to economic crises, which may significantly
depress legitimation strategies and approval ratings for
autocratic rulers and, in turn, create divisions within the
ruling elite (Geddes, 1999; Teorell, 2010).
In addition, Western senders face stronger demands
to sanction countries with high Western linkage (Drez-
ner, 1998). The basic rationale is that political, eco-
nomic, or social ties raise the awareness for a potential
target in the sender, which, in turn, means that informa-
tion about democratic infringements will be conveyed
more easily and that pressure to intervene will be stron-
ger (Smith, 2005). Thus high Western linkage makes
potential targets more prone to external sanction pres-
sure. A growing literature has also dealt with the demo-
cratic impact of so-called ‘black knights’ (e.g. Levitsky &
Way, 2010), most notably China and Russia. Black
knights have the capacity to undermine Western democ-
racy promotion by replacing Western investment when
countries come under increased international pressure,
thereby reducing the potential target’s vulnerability.
Accordingly, we would expect that Western senders are
more reluctant to issue sanctions against countries with
strong black knight support, fearing that such sanctions
would amount to little behavioral concession in the tar-
get state.
H2: Countries politically and economically vulner-
able to Western pressure are more likely to be
targeted by democratic sanctions.
Sender costs
Recent research has shown how democratic sanctions,
and sanctions more generally, tend to destabilize the tar-
geted regime (Marinov, 2005; Escriba`-Folch & Wright,
2010; von Soest & Wahman, forthcoming). If the
regime in power is supportive of Western international
political objectives, such destabilization might come at
a high political and/or economic cost for the sender. It
has been argued that Western powers have tolerated
authoritarian behavior in countries such as Egypt under
Mubarak and Saudi Arabia as they have been important
allies in promoting other, more prioritized foreign policy
goals (e.g. Brownlee, 2012).
Besides these political costs, senders’ economic costs
of issuing sanctions also vary greatly depending on the
potential target’s economic strength and standing in the
global economy. Accordingly, we assume senders to be
more reluctant to target richer countries with a large
economy. Earlier research has also emphasized the
importance of trade (Early, 2011; McLean & Whang,
2010) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Lektzian &
Biglaiser, 2013). Higher trade levels and FDI give more
economic leverage to sanctioners but also increase their
costs. Business representatives have a strong incentive to
lobby against sanctions that cut off their export opportu-
nities and existing business ties to an authoritarian country
(Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1992). Finally, major econo-
mies such as the USA or EU countries are reliant on oil
imports for their industry and transport sectors. Hence,
imposing sanctions on oil exporters can be potentially very
costly for senders.
H3: If their expected political and economic costs
are low, sanction senders are more likely to
impose democratic sanctions.
Data and research design
This study utilizes a sequence of time-series–cross-
sectional logistic analyses where the dependent variable
recorded whether a Western (EU or US) sanction was
imposed in any given year. In the main operationaliza-
tion of the dependent variable we merge the EU and
US categories, implicating that we account for the first
year with an EU or US sanction as the year of the sanc-
tion onset. We also run supplementary analyses where
the EU and US categories were separated. Country-
years where a Western democratic sanction was already
in place at t–1 were left out of the models as sanction
senders could not make a new independent decision
on whether to sanction a specific country.5 We
employed cubic polynomials based on the time since the
last ‘event’ in the data (i.e. the last democratic sanction
onset) to account for possible temporal dependence
5 In some cases sanctions are intensified over the course of the
sanction episode. We have, however, decided only to include the
first year of a sanction episode in our models as including
subsequent years would make it harder to identify the original
sanction trigger.
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(Carter & Signorino, 2010).6 Standard errors have also
been clustered by country.
The sample consists of all authoritarian country-years
(where there was no democratic sanction in place at t–1)
in the period 1990–2010 as defined in the dataset by
Hadenius & Teorell (2007) (updated by Wahman,
Teorell & Hadenius, 2013). In this dataset, all countries
with a democracy score of less than 7.5 on a combined
10-point Freedom House and Polity IV scale were clas-
sified as authoritarian (see below, ‘measurement of inde-
pendent variables’).
How best to distinguish democracy from autocracy
has been a topic of intense debate within political science
(e.g. Collier & Adcock, 2001; Verkuilen & Munck,
2002). As this article uses a continuous rather than a
dichotomous understanding of democracy, Hadenius &
Teorell’s (2007) regime categorization was the most
suitable. However, to ensure that the results are not
dependent on our categorization of democracy, we ran
robustness tests using the dichotomous classification by
Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013).
A new dataset on post-Cold War sanctions
In order to assess the factors which account for the initial
imposition of democratic sanctions we had to clearly dif-
ferentiate various demands connected to sanctions. To
achieve this, we had to go beyond the commonly used
data from Hufbauer et al. (2007) and also Morgan,
Bapat & Krustev (2009) and construct a new dataset.
First and most fundamentally, our dataset divides all
goals into coherent categories and clearly separates dem-
ocratic sanctions from other demands. Adapting the
model proposed by Charron (2011, 7–11; see also Huf-
bauer et al., 2007, 52–55), we classified the goals of
sanctions according to broad categories. We define a
democratic sanction as one that explicitly aims to increase
the level of democracy or human rights. This category
includes those sanctions where the imposing documents
or senders’ statements contain the demand for:
(1) new elections,
(2) the modification of the constitution or the elec-
toral code,
(3) the admission of an international electoral obser-
vation mission,
(4) the restoration of a democratically elected
leader,
(5) the protection of human rights, and/or
(6) the explicit desire to bring about democratic
regime change (Portela & von Soest, 2012).
Furthermore, the dataset recognizes other goals,
which include fighting narcotics, ending the proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction, terminating
bellicosity/establishing peace agreements, and fighting
terrorism. These sanction categories were not included
in the measurement of the dependent variable. How-
ever, sanctions often pursue several goals simultane-
ously. We coded the dependent variable as 1 in cases
where at least one of the stated goals relates to democ-
racy or human rights improvement.
In addition, we had to depart from Hufbauer et al.’s
and Morgan, Bapat and Krustev’s coding of the begin-
ning and end of sanction episodes, as for our analysis it
is important to demarcate the beginning of an episode
as the point not only when entirely new sanctions are
imposed but also when the sanction’s goal changes sub-
stantially so that democratic demands are made. Third,
the dataset runs all the way to 2010, whereas the Huf-
bauer et al. and Morgan, Bapat and Krustev datasets stop
assessing sanction cases at 2005. Also, even the assess-
ment for the cases before this date is often inconclusive.7
Finally, going beyond existing large-N research, which
has focused almost exclusively on economic sanctions, all
coercive measures that potentially exert economic and
political effects are understood as sanctions. These are
economic (e.g. restrictions on exports and imports, aid
sanctions), political (e.g. restrictive measures to enforce
other sanctions), military (e.g. arms embargoes), and dip-
lomatic (e.g. the recalling of ambassadors) sanctions
(Portela & von Soest, 2012).
The dataset is composed of the entire universe of
newly imposed sanctions by the USA and the EU in the
period 1990–2010. Data were obtained from the web-
sites of the US Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol, US State Department, Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls, and the European Commission external
relations departments. These data were complemented
by the Hufbauer et al. and the Morgan, Bapat & Krustev
datasets and further publications (for data sources and
coding procedure see online appendix). The dataset
only includes countries that the Wahman, Teorell &
Hadenius dataset (2013) has coded as being ‘non-
democratic regimes’ at the start of the sanction episode.
6 That is, we include t, t2, and t3 since the last event in all the models.
7 Morgan, Bapat & Krustev (2009) also have several missing sanction
cases, particularly in relation to EU democratic sanctions. More than
one-third of the democratic sanction cases analyzed are not listed in
their dataset.
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Measurement of independent variables
The theory section predicted that the willingness to sanc-
tion non-democratic regimes is a product of a cost–ben-
efit analysis which balances the pressure to impose
sanctions with regime vulnerability and expected costs
for the sender. Below we describe the operationalizations
to measure these three dimensions.
Pressure to impose sanctions. The models include both
clear trigger events and absolute levels of democracy. We
have used the data from Powell & Thyne (2011) to
recognize events of coups. We have excluded cases where
coups replaced a non-elected leader with another (e.g.
intramilitary coups or palace-coups). To measure contro-
versial elections, we utilize the widely used NELDA data-
set (Hyde & Marinov, 2012), which has a comparative
advantage over other sources in its coverage over space
and time. We have coded an election as ‘controversial’
if at least one of the following conditions applies: (i)
there were allegations from Western monitors of signifi-
cant vote fraud, (ii) an international monitor was denied
the opportunity to monitor an election, or (iii) an inter-
national monitor refused to go to an election because it
did not believe that it would be free and fair.8
The models also control for decreases in civil liberties,
by including the one-year change in the Freedom House
Civil Liberties Score. In addition, following Hadenius &
Teorell (2005, 2007), we measure the absolute level of
democracy with a combined Freedom House and Polity
IV score. The combined score is used to compensate for
the individual shortcomings of the two indices (Norris,
2012).9 The aggregate is derived by computing the aver-
age Freedom House political rights and civil liberties
score (reversed and transformed to a 0–10 scale) and
combining it with the revised combined autocracy and
democracy score from the Polity IV data (also converted
to a 0–10 scale).
Above, we argued that the propensity to issue demo-
cratic sanctions is not only a function of different trigger-
ing events but also depend on the existing ties between
potential senders and targets. A clear indication of such
linkage is shared membership in international organizations.
In order to measure the number of organizational ties with
the EU and the USA, we relied on the data collected by
Pevehouse, Nordstrom & Warnke (2004) and counted
the number of organizations where both the sender and
the target are full members. Since the data only went up
to 2000, we updated the dataset for the last decade. Fol-
lowing Pevehouse (2005: 69), we excluded financial, envi-
ronmental, technical, and cultural organizations. For the
EU, we counted all organizations containing at least one
EU member nation.10
Target vulnerability. Different variables are included to
account for the target’s political and economic vulner-
ability. We account for the number of popular protests
by adding the number of antigovernment demonstra-
tions, strikes, and riots recorded in the Banks & Wilson
(2012) dataset.11 To assess economic vulnerability, we
include measures for economic growth and inflation. Eco-
nomic growth is measured as annual percentage growth
in GDP per capita and inflation as the annual percentage
inflation in the GDP deflator (World Bank, 2011).
Although a country is generally vulnerable, it is not
necessarily particularly vulnerable to Western pressure.
Above, we talked about the potential of black knight
support which might influence the decision to impose
democratic sanctions. To account for this aspect, we
include ties to black knights in the model and use the
same approach as in relation to Western organizational
ties. For every country we counted the number of orga-
nizational links between Russia and China and the
potential target.12 Data were taken from Pevehouse,
Nordstrom & Warnke (2004) and updated with infor-
mation from the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 2013).
Sender costs. Economic development is regularly mea-
sured with GDP per capita; the data were taken from the
World Bank’s (2011) World Development Indicators
dataset. Trade is calculated as the absolute dyadic export
and import flows from the senders (the EU and the USA)
to the target; the data were taken from Barbieri, Keshk &
Pollins (2009). Since no combined EU statistics exist for
the period of interest, we approximate EU trade
8 We have not lagged the coups and controversial election variables,
as lagging these variables would seriously underestimate their
importance (normally sanctions would follow promptly after the
trigger event). We found no cases where there are reasons to
suspect revered causality.
9 This combined FH/Polity IV index shows higher validity and
reliability than its constituent parts and also outperforms all rival
indices (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005).
10 We only counted countries that were EU members in that
particular year.
11 Banks & Wilson (2012) count all incidents of antigovernment
demonstrations or riots with more than 100 participants and strikes
with more than 1,000 participants.
12 Excluding those organizations that have the United States or any
EU country as members.
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dependency by adding trade data from the five largest
EU economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
UK). FDI is measured as the net inflow of foreign invest-
ments as a percentage of GDP per capita (World Bank,
2011),13 and oil production in millions of metric tons
(Ross, 2011).
To measure the political dimension of the sender-cost
argument, we rely on the UN general assembly roll-call
data made available by Strezhnev & Voeten (2013) to
establish sender-target political closeness.14 More specifi-
cally, we use their two-category dyadic voting similarity
index (0–1),15 which is calculated for every UN session.
The fundamental reasoning behind this operationaliza-
tion is that it is politically more costly for senders to
impose sanctions on countries that share a similar inter-
national agenda than on those that do not. To establish
the combined EU/US–target political closeness, we use
the mean dyadic voting similarity index between the
United States and the EU and a potential target. The
EU score is approximated by using the mean similarity
index of the five largest EU countries.
Results
The total sample for the merged EU and US models
includes 1,520 country-years across 119 countries.16 In
total, 39 new democratic sanction episodes were initiated
in the period 1990–2010; there was a great deal of over-
lap between EU and US sanction imposition – the EU
imposed 29 democratic sanctions whereas the United
States initiated new sanctions in 27 events. In case of
overlapping sanctions, the sanction episode is initiated
when the first sender (either the EU or the USA)
imposed sanctions.
All independent variables, with the exception of the
democratic trigger variables and protests, were lagged one
year to assure temporal priority. Due to the relative rarity
of democratic sanction onset we have also run rare-event
logistic models as robustness check (King & Zeng,
2001). Running the analyses as rare event models did not
alter the results substantially. All models also include cubic
polynomials to account for possible temporal dependence
and we have checked the models for multicollinearity.
Coups d’e´tat as fundamental triggers of democratic
sanctions
In Models 1–4 (Table I), we show the impact of our four
trigger variables; coups, controversial elections, decrease
in civil liberties, and the absolute level of democracy.
Model 1 shows the main specification, Model 2 uses the
Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013) authoritarian sample, and
Models 3 and 4 separate EU and US sanctions, respec-
tively. Apart from the trigger variables the models also
control for whether a non-democratic sanction (e.g. aim-
ing at fighting terrorism or establishing peace) was
already in place at t–1.
The models clearly support H1 that sanctions are
often an effect of dramatic trigger events rather than
constantly low levels of democracy or more subtle
declines. Whereas the coefficients for coups and interna-
tionally controversial elections are strongly significant,
the results are not supportive of the idea that absolute
low levels of democracy or declining levels of civil liber-
ties increase the probability of democratic sanctions. The
coefficient for the levels of democracy is insignificant in
all models, regardless of whether we use the HTW or
BMR sample or whether we separate EU and US sanc-
tions. Similarly, the effect of declining levels of civil lib-
erties is small and insignificant. A dramatic decline in
the respect of civil liberties, resulting in a 3-point
increase in the Freedom House Civil Liberties score
(high Freedom House scores represent low levels of civil
liberties), in the absence of a coup or controversial elec-
tion only increases the predicted probability of a demo-
cratic sanction by less than 0.02.17
In contrast to the insignificant effect of declining civil
liberties levels, Table II shows how coups and controver-
sial elections change the predicted probability of a dem-
ocratic sanction. In the instance of a coup, the predicted
13 Note that the FDI data is not dyadic. Unfortunately, data
availability has made it impossible to use dyadic data without
losing a significant part of our sample. However, as an additional
robustness test we replaced the FDI variable with a variable
accounting for bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Here we note
whether a BIT is active between the USA and/or the EU in any
given year. We only include individual BITs with the EU. Data on
BITs are collected from UNCTAD.
14 Earlier examples of studies using UN vote data to measure dyadic
political closeness include Gartzke (1998) and Alesina & Dollar
(2000).
15 The voting similarity index (0–1) is equal to (total number of votes
where both countries agree divided by total number of joint votes).
We use two-category vote data (yes or no), and not the similarity
index also including ‘abstain’ as an option.
16 The sample becomes somewhat larger in the separate models
(especially the model only looking at the EU) as fewer country-years
are excluded due to the fact that a democratic sanction was already
in place at t–1. It is possible that sanctions were implemented by a
different sender. Such cases would not be recognized as a new
sanction in the merged models, but would be of importance in the
models where EU and US sanctions are separated. 17 See Figure A1 of the online appendix.
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probability of a Western democratic sanction increases
with a dramatic 0.52.18 The effect of controversial elec-
tions is also strong, but not as substantial as the effect of
coups. A controversial election increases the probability
of a democratic sanction by about 0.07. Both the EU and
the USA (Models 3 and 4) are significantly more likely to
sanction a country if it has experienced a coup or a contro-
versial election,19 but there are some differences between
the two senders in how much these two trigger variables
change the predicted probability of a sanction. The effect
of a controversial election is somewhat larger for the
probability of an EU sanction, whereas coups have
a larger effect for US sanctions. A potential explanation
warranting further analysis could be the EU’s compara-
tively strong election oversight within its region
(Donno, 2013: 118–120). But the main results stay the
same for both sanction senders.
A potential explanation for the strong effect of coups is
that the coup variable simply represents a dramatic decline
in democracy. It might, hence, be that cases with similar
declines in democracy, without a coup, would face the
same increased risk of being punished byWestern senders.
However, robustness tests with interaction terms between
Table I. Triggers for democratic sanctions
Democratic sanctions
HTW (Western
sanctions)
BMR (Western
sanctions)
HTW (EU
sanctions)
HTW (US
sanctions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coup 5.127** (.763) 4.869** (.644) 3.765** (.695) 4.947** (.680)
Controversial election 2.584** (.458) 2.433** (.407) 2.620** (.464) 2.275** (.495)
Decrease in civil liberties .411 (.318) .453 (.354) .368 (.363) .349 (.417)
Level of democracy (0–10) –.056 (.089) –.040 (.095) –.081 (.090) –.116 (.111)
Non-democratic sanction (lagged) .053 (.622) .031 (.654) –.273 (.781) –.523 (.999)
Constant –1.135 (.716) –2.177* (.875) –1.956* (.943) –1.115 (.860)
Country-years 1,520 1,529 1,668 1,583
Countries 119 119 123 119
Log pseudo likelihood –114.581 –121.533 –104.544 –85.068
Pseudo R2 .381 .331 .285 .360
**p < .01, *p < .05, yp < .1. Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses. All models
include cubic polynomials (not presented in table).
Table II. Change in predicted probability
Trigger
Probability change
(Western sanction)
Probability change
(EU sanction)
Probability change
(US sanction)
Coup .517 .231 .349
90% Conf. interval .268–.767 .044–.417 .070–.615
Internationally controversial election .073 .083 .032
90% Conf. interval .002–.144 –.006–.172 –.000–.064
Probability
(Western sanction)
Probability
(EU sanction)
Probability
(US sanction)
Baseline probability, no coup and no controversial election .007 .007 .004
90% Conf. interval .001–.012 .001–.013 .001–.007
The partial change is computed with the prchange command in the Spost add-on module for Stata (Long & Freese, 2006). Calculations are
made for a country with ten years without prior sanctions (e.g. a country in year 2000 without prior sanctions in our studied time period,
t1 ¼ 10, t2 ¼ 100, t3 ¼ 1,000). In the calculation for coups we assume no controversial election in the same year; for controversial elections
we assume no coup. All other continuous variables are held at their means.
18 Probability calculated for a country with ten prior years without
sanctions, no internationally controversial elections, and all other
continuous variables held at their mean.
19 However, with the specification of the post estimation the
marginal effect of controversial elections in the separated EU and
US models falls just short of the 90% confidence interval.
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coups and changed levels of democracy, presented in the
online appendix, show that countries with coups are signif-
icantlymore likely to experience democratic sanctions than
countries without coups but similar levels of democratic
decline.20 Furthermore, these robustness tests also demon-
strate that a coup paired with a dramatic decline in democ-
racy almost inevitably leads to a democratic sanction.
Selective targeting of authoritarian regimes
The analyses made clear that democratic sanctions are
regularly a reaction to dramatic trigger events, most nota-
bly coups and also to some extent controversial elections.
However, the response to triggers is only one part of the
story. To study the selective targeting of sanctions we
introduce Table III.
The main models in Table III are Models 5 and 6,
whereas Model 7 adds an interaction term between con-
troversial elections and FDI.21 Most fundamentally,
Models 5 and 6 strongly confirm that Western senders
apply democratic sanctions selectively, even when con-
trolling for the two most important triggers, coups and
controversial elections. The results lend strong support
for both H2 and H3, indicating that senders are more
likely to sanction vulnerable states where the chance of
success is high and that sanctions are more likely when
the expected economic and political costs are low.
Several of the coefficients for the variables associated
with target vulnerability in Table III are statistically signif-
icant and in the expected direction. Both models support
the idea that sanctions are more likely in countries with
high levels of inflation. The coefficient for popular protests
falls just short of statistical significance at the 10% level in
Model 5, but is significant at the lowest level of significance
in the model using the BMR sample (Model 6).
We also find support for the idea that sanctions are
more common against countries with high organizational
linkage to the West. These are countries where the expec-
tation to impose sanctions and their expected effectiveness
are high (Table III).22 Other authors have included a
variable measuring the geographic proximity between the
capital of the sender and the capital of the target (Gle-
ditsch & Ward, 2001, 2006). However, our findings
regarding proximity are mixed. Whereas geographical
proximity is significant in the EU model, it is not for the
US model.23 This indicates that simply measuring geo-
graphic proximity is too crude a proxy for linkage and stra-
tegic importance. Linkage between senders and targets can
be high despite large geographic distance. In Table A3 of
the online appendix we introduce a model of EU and US
sanctions with region dummies. The results show regional
differences, but most fundamentally also suggest a rela-
tionship that is more complex than a linear relationship
between sanction propensity and geographic distance. In
addition, we do not find any significant results in relation
to the linkage to potential sanction busters (China and
Russia). This is not to say that the support of potential
black knights is unimportant; however, such dynamics are
not captured by the estimation strategies employed here.
We also find strong support for H3, arguing that high
political and economic costs for the potential sender
reduce their inclination to impose democratic sanctions.
There is a strong and negative correlation between the
political closeness of a potential authoritarian target to
the West and the probability of democratic sanctions.24
The more similar to the West an authoritarian country
votes in the UN General Assembly, the less likely it is
to be targeted by Western democratic sanctions. These
results support the idea put forward in earlier research
that political considerations affect the degree to which
the West enforces democratic norms in authoritarian
countries (Donno, 2013).
Models 5 and 6 also support H3 in regard to eco-
nomic costs for the sender. We do not find any signifi-
cant results in relation to trade and oil production, but
we find limited support for the claim that economically
poor countries are more likely to get sanctioned. The
coefficient for GDP per capita is not significant in Model
6, but it is significant in Model 5 at the 5% level.25 Most
importantly, however, there is a statistically significant
and strong negative correlation between FDI and the
20 See Figure A2 in the online appendix.
21 Due to the inclusion of the black knight organizational ties
variable, China and Russia are not included in the sample of the
Table III models. However, we also re-ran the models without con-
trol for black knight organizational ties (and including Russia and
China) without any changes in the substantial results.
22 The models are somewhat affected by multicollinearity. Table A1
in the online appendix shows multicollinearity statistics. VIF scores in
regard to Western trade, political closeness, andWestern organization
ties are all above 10. However, excluding highly correlated covariates
does not substantially alter the results.
23 See Table A2 of the online appendix.
24 Here we use a one-year lag for the political closeness measure. How-
ever the data represent UN assembly sessions rather than calendar
years. Occasionally sessions run into January in the next calendar year.
To ensure temporal priority, we also ran the models using a two-year
lag. Increasing the lag did not affect the significance of the closeness
measure.
25 Log transforming the GDP per capita measure does not change the
results substantially.
10 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
probability for democratic sanctions. As we do not have
sufficient dyadic FDI data, we also introduce Model 12
(Table A4) as a robustness test in the online appendix. In
this model, we replace FDI with bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the EU/USA and the potential
target. As with FDI, we observe a significant and nega-
tive coefficient between western BITs and the propensity
for democratic sanctions.26 In Model 7 we introduce an
interaction term between controversial elections and
FDI (plotted in Figure 2).
As argued in the theory section, controversial elections
represent a ‘weaker’ trigger than coups where potential
senders might be especially reluctant to issue costly sanc-
tions.27 Indeed, the interaction term shows that sanc-
tions are less common after controversial elections in
countries with high levels of FDI. In countries without
any foreign investments the predicted probability of a
democratic sanction is approximately 0.17 after a contro-
versial election. When FDI makes up 10% of the GDP,
however, the probability of a democratic sanction after a
controversial election is only about 0.03. The strong
results in relation to FDI are very much in line with the
recent findings of Lektzian & Biglaiser (2014) regarding
the imposition of all US sanctions (sanctions implemen-
ted to achieve various goals).
Conclusion
Although the so-called selection bias has been described
as a fundamental problem in the study of sanction effec-
tiveness, the literature reveals conflicting expectations of
how this selective use of sanctions biases the results of
empirical sanctions research (Morgan & Schwebach,
1997; Nooruddin, 2002). Moreover, there has been little
discussion about the fact that international sanctions are
designed to accomplish varying types of behavioral
change by the target. When making the strategic deci-
sion (not) to impose sanctions, the prospective sender
accounts for the target’s actual behavior and considers its
own economic and political costs.
Table III. Determinants of democratic sanctions
HTW
(Western sanctions)
BMR
(Western sanctions)
HTW
(Western sanctions)
(5) (6) (7)
Coup 5.128** (.994) 5.050** (.812) 5.121** (1.014)
Controversial election 2.909** (.449) 2.881** (.412) 3.278** (.495)
Non-democratic sanction t–1 .848 (.567) .483 (.704) .870 (.560)
Protests .095 (.060) .123y (.063) .090 (.065)
GDP growth t–1 –.026 (.032) –.024 (.035) –.023 (.030)
GDP inflation t–1 .022** (.008) .031** (.009) .022** (.008)
GDP per capita (thousands USD) t–1 –.178* (.088) –.115 (.091) –.181* (.088)
Western organizational ties t–1 .301** (.116) .338* (.132) .316** (.115)
Black knight organizational ties t–1 –.082 (.156) –.107 (.135) –.048 (.160)
Political closeness t–1 –4.413** (1.640) –5.587** (1.831) –4.495* (1.741)
Western trade (log) –.083 (.173) –.073 (.135) –.091 (.175)
Oil production t–1 .001 (.007) –.001 (.008) .002 (.007)
FDI t–1 –.046* (.022) –.056** (.016) –.029 (.036)
Controversial election*FDI t–1 _ _ –.236* (.120)
Constant –.963 (1.490) –2.620y (1.544) –.992 (1.537)
Country-years 1,219 1,229 1,219
Countries 104 103 104
Log pseudo likelihood –93.899 –90.423 –92.617
Pseudo R2 .434 .419 .441
**p < .01, *p < .05, yp < .1. Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses. All models
include cubic polynomials (not presented in table).
26 See footnote 13 for operationalization.
27 It is also possible to think of instances where the reactions to coups
are conditioned on the expected sender costs. However, senders are
likely to react to coups differently depending on the nature of the
new regime (i.e. depending on whether the new regime is likely to
pursue a pro-Western political agenda or not).
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The results of our logistic regressions show that sen-
ders are most likely to respond with sanctions after dra-
matic trigger events, such as coups d’e´tat, where the
international pressure to sanction is high. Hence, West-
ern senders do in fact react on drastic infringements of
civil liberties and political rights and where arguably the
effect of democratic sanctions is strong. This contradicts
the assumption that senders are purely motivated by real-
politik and geostrategic interests. The likelihood of sanc-
tions also increases with less dramatic trigger events like
controversial elections, especially if the expected domes-
tic costs for the sender are low. We have also shown that
sanction implementation is more likely in unstable and
thereby vulnerable regimes – those with mobilized citi-
zens and crumbling economies.
Yet although international pressure to impose sanc-
tions on repressive authoritarian regimes has generally
increased in the post-Cold War period, senders balance
the aim of instigating democratic reform abroad with
other national interests. Clearly, potential senders also
take their own political and economic costs into consid-
eration when deciding whether to impose sanctions to
improve levels of democracy in authoritarian countries.
Those authoritarian countries that pursue a similar inter-
national agenda as the West, as approximated by similar
voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, are signif-
icantly less likely to be targeted by democratic sanctions.
Similarly, Western senders are mindful of the economic
repercussions that democratic sanctions have for them-
selves. High FDI in a prospective authoritarian target
(strongly) and GDP per capita (to a limited extent)
reduce the EU’s and USA’s inclination to impose demo-
cratic sanctions.
All in all, the implementation of democratic sanctions
is not a pure reflection of the level of autocracy or repres-
sion in a given country. Unstable autocracies with swift
democratic deterioration are far more likely to be sanc-
tioned than stable repressive autocracies with constantly
low levels of democracy. These results have implications
for comparative democratization and sanctions research.
Those wishing to study the effect of international factors
in domestic processes of democratization must be aware
of the potential endogeneity problem; Western nations
are likely to put less democratization pressure on regimes
expected to be stable than countries with high vulner-
ability. Ineffective, drawn-out sanction episodes against
stable authoritarian regimes come with high economic
and political costs for the sender and thus diminish
returns for the imposing government (Bolks & Al-
Sowayel, 2000; Dizaji & van Bergeijk, 2013).
This study was carried out with a large sample of cases
covering an extensive period of time. In the future, more
qualitative case study research is needed to study deci-
sions to impose democratic sanctions in greater detail,
which should help to further uncover causal mechanisms
and enhance our understanding of specific sanction sen-
ders. Also, the differences in sanctioning behavior
between the EU and the United States warrants further
systematic analysis. As sanctions have become one of the
most important tools to push authoritarian states toward
democracy, understanding how this tool is used in the
post-Cold War era is key for comparative politics analysis
focused on democratization and international relations
research concerned with the effects of sanctions.
Replication data
The online appendix, codebook, and do-files for the
empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://
www.prio.no/jpr/datasets and at http://www.giga-ham-
burg.de/en/team/soest and https://sites.google.com/site/
miwahman1/.
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